I know I haven’t been updating this blog because I’m too lazy. Years 2 and 3 have been an exciting flurry of business (both work and busy-ness). I constantly spew bite-sized thoughts that stream into my mind on Instagram Stories anyway, and I am remarkably easily bored and excitable, so longer, more considered pieces on Blogger aren’t sustainable. I digress. Many exciting life updates! I’m now officially done with my undergraduate PPE programme at King’s College London. I loved every bit of it: the depth, rigour and intellectual intensity of the course, the international student community, the bustling city of London and all the travel opportunities around Europe. Words can’t do justice to the profundity of the experience. In typical Quincean fashion, I milked everything I could out of the three years: went to Cumberland Lodge (for free) as a photographer with the Philosophy Department in Years 1 and 3, clinched the Principal’s Global Leadership Award (PGLA) in my second year (spending
The Awkward Yeti on Facebook I thank Cui Zizai — my old friend, former classmate, collaborator and interlocutor — for this opportunity to revisit Hume. Zizai sent me an email (one of his periodic circulars on mathematics, politics and philosophy) regarding his take on Hume, in particular the infamous line “reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions” in Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature (“ Treatise ”). Sent 1:28 am, 26 December 2020 (UTC+08:00) Zizai has two concerns which I shall attempt to address: Is the bipartite claim “reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions” is–ought fallacious? Does Hume offer an argument for his “ought” claim? How can it be justified? Is the bipartite claim “reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions” is–ought fallacious? Let us refer to Hume’s introduction of the is–ought problem ( Treatise 3.1.1.27 ): I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance.